1: Meek E, G-5 (1925-1930) 1931
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derived considerable benefit, the bride-price in each case having been appropriated by him. B. also handed over one of his sons to his elder brother, as the elder brother had only one son of his own to look after him, and that son was unable by his own farming efforts to provide for the whole household. B. also gave a son to his younger brother who lived in the same compound as B. That younger brother was murdered, and the son has reverted to the custody of his father. B. has, therefore, handed over three of his nine children to relatives. Moreover, he handed over one of his younger brother's orphan children to the care of his (B's) grown-up grandson.

C. had a family of six daughters and two sons. He handed over his eldest daughter to his male ortho-cousin, her economic services being thus placed at the disposal of the cousin's wives. The cousin will arrange the girl's marriage, receive the bride-price, provide the wedding outfit, and again receive the bride-price on each occasion that she remarries. His second daughter was similarly handed over to another ortho-cousin. Both these cousins occupied a separate portion of C's compound. The other children are with C. who has yet another cousin living with him. C. does no farming work himself, and his two eldest boys, therefore, work daily under the direction of this cousin. It is *infra dignitatem* for the head of a large compound to engage personally in agriculture; and this brings us to the subject of the control of the economic resources of the household.

A. may have been 37 years of age—he was certainly not over 40. But having been successful in life, i.e. having a large number of children (which implies capital and the ability to purchase wives), he does no farm work. He relies on his sons whose energies he directs, offering advice as to the extent of the farm required each year, but avoiding all direct interference as regards the disposal of the corn harvested. That is to say, he would never enter his son's granary and help himself to corn. He possesses no granary of his own. One of the sons issues each day the amount of corn required for the whole compound. A. will find for himself the amount of the tax required by the Administration. His sons can find their own from the sale of corn, though A. might say "Do not touch the corn—we may require it all. I will see what I can do on my own initiative".

B. similarly does no farm work. He has two sons who farm

1: Meek E, G-5 (1925-1930) 1931
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592 422 together, and each, being married, has his own granary with which B. does not interfere. He and his wives are supported by the sons. B. may have to call on his sons to provide the tax by the sale of corn. But the women of the compound, being the owners of bean farms, and able also to obtain cash by the sale of firewood, may contribute towards the cost of the tax in order to avoid drawing too extensively on the reserves of corn. B., who is not a very old man, and may wish to add to the number of his wives, may direct his sons to sell some of their corn in order to find the bride-price.

C. has three cousins (ortho-cousins) in his compound. Two of these occupy one part of the compound and farm together. These cousins have their own corn granary, and C. would have no claim at all on their corn. If, however, the supplies in his own part of the compound ran short, C. might ask his cousins to help him out of the difficulty. He might even ask his cousins to assist him in the matter of paying tax. But any advances of this kind would be regarded purely and simply as a loan, C. being the senior of the household. On the other hand, if a younger "brother" had to borrow from an elder, the elder would not think of asking his younger brother to repay him later.

C. with a third cousin and their respective families occupies a separate part of the compound. Though he is only 30 years of age, C., being the head of the compound, has given up all farming work, which is carried out by the cousin and C's two sons. They have a common granary, for it is a custom that those who farm together share their corn. The granary is under the control of C's cousin who directs C's son as to the amount of corn that should be issued daily. C. has no say in the matter, but in the event of having to entertain strangers C. may ask the cousin to issue the necessary extra corn. C. may also demand some of the corn harvested by his son to pay his tax.

It will be seen, therefore, that, apart from the natural claim which a father has to be supported by his sons, there is in a Katab household no such thing as a real community of stocks. The head of a compound has no claim on the corn of a brother or cousin who farms by himself, and he does not, therefore, hold himself responsible if the brother or cousin fails to farm sufficient corn to pay his tax.

4: Cole G-5 (1948) 1949 FF38 Katab FF38
Kagoro
Jaba

41. As pointed out in the Kano and Plateau Reports it is necessary that the greatest care should be taken when such "registration" takes place in order that no doubt can be left as to precisely what the lender of the land is giving and the borrower receiving. The need for some such form of registration could not be better illustrated than by the District Head's realisation of the need and his attempt to meet that need. Plateau Report paragraph 139. Kano Report paragraph 71. 423 689 217

42. The produce of economic trees belongs to the owner of the farm on which the tree stands. It does not pass either with exchange, loan or pledge. The produce of economic trees not on farmlands, *e.g.*, the oil palms in the kurumi, is held to be public property and anyone is at liberty to take it. There appear to be no particular or special prescriptive rights to particular persons in regard to economic trees. Sylvan produce. 422

JABA KWOI DISTRICT

43. Some distance to the west of the Kagoro district and separated from it by a spur of the Zaria Emirate lies the Jaba Kwoi independent district. Until 1934 it was administered as part of the Plateau Province. In that year, however, it was detached from the Plateau Province and became an independent district of the Zaria Province within which the rest of the Jaba tribe reside under Emirate control. The Emirate boundary thus divides the Jabawa of whom there are about 24,500, 14,000 of whom live in the independent district and 10,500 in the Kachia district of the Zaria Emirate. This Emirate boundary marks the boundary between those Jabawa who accepted Fulani domination and those who continued to resist and retained their independence by hiding in the once thickly forested valleys of their district. 101 131 [161] [648]

44. The attempt to relate territorial village units of the Jaba Kwoi independent district with separate kindreds or family groups was here, as with the Kagoro, abortive. Whatever may have been the basis of land tenure in the past there can be no doubt that it is now, in the great majority of cases, individual. The family or extended family holding of land is abundantly less common than that of the individual. The reason for this state of affairs lies, as with the Kagoro, in the continual harrying and dispersal of the original inhabitants by the Fulani. Kindred lands were of necessity widely fragmented and with neither the cohesion of a settled existence or of a compact living space the kindred holding concept was undermined. Support for this theory is very evident in the fact, reverted to in paragraph 63 below, that the Jabawa who accepted Fulani domination and consequently were not widely scattered and harried still retain this concept and still have compact lands. Breakdown to individual tenure. 621 423

would not allow land to lie fallow for ten years even— 423
for fear of claim jumping; 426

(*ii*) even if left for two seasons a farm would become so hard and sunbaked that it would need a major operation to bring it back into cultivation;

(*iii*) if a farm were left unfarmed for a few seasons bush fires would destroy the economic trees and since the existence of economic trees is *prima facie* evidence of the land having been occupied an occupier would not wish to loose this evidence.

Economic trees.

55. The four economic trees are dorowa, attile, oil palm and bambami, the latter a shrub whose bark is used as a dye. The owner of a farm is entitled to the produce of all the economic trees on it— 422 245
even after he has loaned it or pledged it to another. No prescriptive rights in any particular trees seem to be recognised nowadays though it is recorded, in a Zaria file, that two men were once victimised for not taking attile nuts to the Village Head. It was stated in the Administrative Report that this was a survival of an old custom. There was a public announcement to the effect that this payment might go on as a gift but could not be *enforced*. There is no trace of it now.

P.C.J. 2061/34, page 89.

56. It will be seen that there is surprisingly little divergence in custom or practice regarding land tenure in these two small independent districts. The pattern follows much of what has been described by Mr Rowling in his Plateau Report—apart from the complications met there caused by the tin mining industry. [84]

PAGAN AREAS UNDER EMIRATE CONTROL
KACHIA DISTRICT

District organisation.

57. Before passing on to a pagan tribe wholly included in the Emirate it may be convenient to consider the remainder of the Jawaba who reside within the Emirate. They occupy the south and south-easterly portions of the Kachia district. This district consists of the Hausa enclave of Kachia, from which the district is administered, and elements of the Kaje, Kadara and Kuturmi tribes. 101 563

Details are:—

Jabawa	...	...	...	10,539
Kadara	...	...	...	7,173
Hausa	...	...	...	2,994
Kuturmi	...	...	...	2,834
Kaje	...	...	...	798

[161]

~~10~~
[p. 16]